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1  The historiography on late colonialism and decolonization1 has benefited, in the last
decade or so,  from a major input from historians and social  scientists  alike.2 While
international  factors  have  always  been  a  major  concern  of  the  several  histories  of
imperial  demise,  they  were  equated  for  a  long  time  with  the  major  geopolitical
transformations  brought  upon  after 1945  and  mostly  focused  on  security  and
diplomatic  rationales.3 More  recently,  a  number  of  studies  have  transferred  the
analytical gaze to lesser-known topics, processes and actors that shaped the final years
of European rule in Africa and Asia. Anti-colonial and racial transnational solidarities
or cultural exchanges, for instance, were scrutinized under a new light in relation to
the process of global decolonization.4 Quite naturally, international institutions were
one of the several new actors that were deservedly included in the new histories of
decolonization.
2  In fact, whereas for decades the United Nations was the single institutional space that
counted for the history of decolonization, in recent years other institutions such as the
World  Health  Organization,  the  United  Nations  Education,  Science  and  Culture
Organization or the International Labour Organization were included in narratives that





3  Studies about the role played by this sort of organizations in the Portuguese historical
trajectory of imperial demise are only now beginning to appear. Traditional narratives
about  the  international  dimensions  of  Portuguese  late  colonialism  focus
overwhelmingly on the bilateral engagements with western allies or on the debates at
the UN, especially after the beginning of the colonial wars in 1961. Yet, the Portuguese
case,  I  argue,  can  be  particularly  revealing  given  its  chronological  and  political
particularities. In this article I will address the period between 1945 and 1962, which is
usually  less  studied.  It  is  my  aim  to  show  that  significant  exchanges  between  the
Portuguese empire and international organizations shaped decolonization, as a longue
durée process,  just before 1961  and  afterwards.  Certainly,  the  dynamics  of  the
internationalization of the “native” labour question predated 1945. But my focus here
is  to  address  the  main  changes  that  occurred  following  the  end  of  World  War II,
impeding upon the political, economic, social and cultural reconfiguration of European
colonialism. The article ends in 1962, the year all legal modalities of forced labour in
the  empire  were  abolished.  The  historical  endpoint  is  set  also  to  stress  that  the
conditioning  of  Portuguese  colonialism  politics  and  policies  by  international
institutions was in place well before 1961, although manifesting itself in distinct ways.
4  By focusing on the question of the internationalization of the “native labour” question I
will put forward three main arguments.6 Firstly, that international organizations did
shape the historical trajectory of Portuguese late colonialism immediately after 1945
and cannot be analytically detached from major juridical, political and socio-economic
changes  that  occurred  within  the  empire.  Secondly,  that  the  debates  on  the  social
dimensions of  colonial  rule were closely linked to broader political,  diplomatic  and
ideological debates on the legitimacy of empire. Thirdly, that the impact and outcome
of the interaction between the state-empire and international institutions varied
greatly across different historical conjunctures and institutional settings, generating
diverse responses.
5  Within these general assumptions, I also highlight a historical process that can help
rethink the broader historical interactions between internationalism and colonialism
in  the  aftermath  of  World  War II.7 Being  an  empire-state  characterized  by  its
metropolitan  authoritarian  nature,  international  institutions  worked  as  privileged
spaces of denunciation and dissent in the Portuguese case, given the absence of local
and legitimate structures for expressing grievances. These opportunities were grabbed
by groups and networks that channelled new information and data about local realities.
Portuguese authorities rejected all  accusations expressed abroad. Yet,  depending on
the political suitability of the historical moment, the authorities cautiously engaged
with  international  institutions,  sometimes  rejecting  any  kind  of  collaboration,
sometimes accepting an unprecedented degree of international meddling in imperial
affairs.
6  Of  course,  this  should  not  elide  other  kinds  of  inter-imperial  and  inter-colonial
instances of cooperation, especially those within the framework of the inter-imperial
Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara and ad-hoc ones
that are not covered in this article.8 But, as a main consequence of this broader process,
international institutions gained a substantial leverage in their interaction with the
Portuguese empire. What is more, I will argue, they became pivotal in the dynamics of
political  and legal  continuity and change.  Sometimes this  happened in the wake of




process that triggered new instances of imperial self-scrutiny and the internalization of
international standards and norms.
7  External impulses for legal reform, of course, were not always successful. And when
they were, they frequently were the result of a predominant political and diplomatic
calculus, especially as global decolonization was gathering momentum. Even its actual
consequences  should  be  duly  analysed.  The  legal  changes,  both  domestic  or
international,  were far more progressive than the general prevailing administration
political  imaginations and,  quite naturally,  resistance by the ‘man on the spot’  was
expressed. As we shall see, major juridical transformations were often understood as a
cosmetic  move  to  assure  that  everything  remained  as  it  stood.  Nonetheless,  these
international  “inputs”  not  only  became  increasingly  present  in  the  daily  lives  of
imperial and colonial officials, but they also frame the political and legal changes that




8  World  War II  entailed  significant  changes  in  colonial  labour  and social  politics  and
policies.  These  were  put  forward  by  metropolitan  governments  and  colonial
authorities, for instance in French and British colonies in West Africa.9 They were also
codified by the International Labour Organization through a series of recommendations
and  conventions,  promulgated  between 1944  and 1947.  Despite  their  shortcomings,
they represented a major transformation of the languages and programmes mobilized
to  address  social  and  labour  relations  in  the  colonies.  These  included  the  growing
participation  and  legitimization  of  African  trade  unions,  their  participation  in
collective bargaining and the resolution of industrial disputes, and more broadly in the
subordination of new developmentalist drives to the welfare of native populations.10
9  By  then,  Portuguese  authorities  still  had  fresh  memories  of  past  events  of  the
international  denunciation  of  “native”  labour  realities  in  the  colonies.  The Cocoa
Scandal,  in São Tomé,  related to the forced migration of  Angolan and Mozambican
workers to the archipelago plantations or, later on, the famous report by the American
sociologist Edward Ross that eventually reached the newly created Temporary Slavery
Commission of the League of Nations were some of them, and probably the most vivid
ones.11
10  Yet,  unlike  other  imperial  formations,  socio-political  transformations  were  mostly
absent. The 1926 Indigenato  regime, the dual juridical regime that governed imperial
and  colonial  relations  and  which  crystallized  the  fundamental  discrimination  of
indígenas  (natives), remained unchanged. The related 1928 Código  do  Trabalho  Indígena
(Native Labour Code) suffered no alterations as well. With the moral duty to work as its
cornerstone,  the  Code  allowed for  multiple  modalities  of  coerced labour  for  public
enterprises and invested administrative authorities with loose powers to facilitate the
recruitment of African workers and repress absenteeism.12
11  Whereas in other colonial possessions forced labour was being gradually abolished, in
the Portuguese African colonies, especially as commodity prices rose because of the
global conflict and thousands of settlers began arriving in Angola and Mozambique, its




widespread  prevalence  of  forced  labour  in  Angola  and  Mozambique  and  the
“anomalies”  related  to  the  repatriation  of  migrant  workers  (serviçais)  in  S. Tomé  e
Príncipe. The archipelago was still receiving thousands of Angolans and Mozambicans.
Several inspectors stressed the persistence of abuses and social malaise. Prostitution by
the female serviçais was one of them.13 Suicide within the migrant workforce, generated
by working and living conditions and by the obstacles to repatriation, was another.14 In
S. Tomé, for instance, a local official report of 1945, which signalled the existence of
shackled Africans, was dubbed as “impressive” and containing “extremely damaging
accusations.15” In the district of Manica and Sofala,  in Mozambique, another official
stated that, since the “native [was] by nature indolent and naturally rebel to work,” the
“condemnable system of rounding up blacks in the sanzala” was still necessary. The law
was “dead letter”.16
12  Acknowledgement  of  local  conditions  added  to  Portuguese  administrative  concern
regarding the transformation of the international normative order. By then, ILO sui
generis  nature made it a tripartite organization since “national” delegations included
government representatives but also one workers’ and one employers’ delegate. This
formulation was the result of historical constraints that made ILO’s constitution deeply
committed to the idea of social justice through dialogue. However, in the late 1940s
these  procedures  were  not  extended to  the  African continent.  Until  the  late 1950s,
Africa’s representation at the ILO was dissimilar to other regional spaces. There was no
African regional branch until that date, which would eventually extend the tripartite
procedures to the debates on social and labour policies in the continent. Instead, there
was  the  Experts’  Committee  on  Social  Policy  in  Non-Metropolitan  Territories
(1947-1957), which replaced the previous Committee of Experts on Native Labour. It
was the ILO administration who, in theory, chose the experts on technical grounds. In
fact,  colonial  powers  had  the  ability  to  condition  the  decisions.  But  it  was  still  an
“exception” to ILO’s regular functioning that would be overcome with the creation of
the ILO Africa regional branch as decolonization gathered pace.17
13  Despite  its  limitations,  that  specific  ILO  approach to  the  African  continent  did  not
prevent Portuguese officials from appraising the new, post-1945 ILO conventions for
non-metropolitan territories as the most damaging to state-empire interests. As one
old-colonial  expert  put  it,  they  did  not  consider  colonial  and  native  “special”
conditions. Concepts such as “slavery” or “trusteeship” were being replaced by others,
such  as  minimum  wage  and  trade  unions.18 As  another  official  stated,  a  “colonial
prejudice”  prevailed  in  those  meetings.19 In  a  report  prepared  for  the 1946
International  Labour  Conference  in  Montreal,  an  imperial  official  was  crystal  clear
about the new international  spirit.  The idea of  racial  non-discrimination applied to
African workers was simply “anti-economic and anti-social”. For instance, it would be
“unreasonable  and  counterproductive”  to  afford  local  populations  the  right  to
unionize.20
14  The  problem  was  not,  at  the  time,  limited  to  the  new  ILO  conventions  for  non-
metropolitan territories. Even the interwar conventions on forced labour, recruitment,
contracts  and  penal  sanctions  in  the  case  of  breach  of  contract  were  seen  as
inadequate. They did not take into account the “deep differences” between territories.21
Accordingly, by the late 1940s the Portuguese were the only European empire that had




15  During the late 1940s, foreign criticisms of Portuguese labour realities across empire
were mostly absent. But that did not prevent several administrative and diplomatic
cadres from pointing out the international salience of the problem of forced labour. In
particular, the drain of native workers from Angola and Mozambique to neighbouring
colonies was seen as incontrovertible proof of Portuguese imperial inability to govern
subject peoples. Forced labour was an increasingly “effervescent affair in international
bodies”, as one official stated.22 Consular officials in places such as Belgium raised the
alert about news being published about “native labour in our colonies of Angola and
Mozambique”,  while  the  same  was  happening  at  the  Embassy  in  Washington D.C.
regarding an article published in the New Orleans Times.23
16  This  constellation  of  processes  did  impact  imperial  ruminations.  Although  the
Portuguese government did not adhere to international labour standards, the existing
legislation  was  increasingly  scrutinized  according  to  ILO  conventions.  Experts  and
authorities alike recommended that new bodies should be created with the single task
of  compiling  and  monitoring  the  debates  and  standard-setting  procedures  of  the
organization.24 Legal  changes  were  urged  in  strict  connection  with  international
developments. As one official stated, a “comprehensive international movement for the
uplift  of  workers  conditions”  and  “civilization’s  progress”  demanded  new  political
action.25 A few officials suggested one of two possibilities:  to ratify some of the ILO
conventions for the colonies or to adapt existing juridical and social precepts to the
new international and colonial realities.26 However, the limited reach of the changes
proposed was manifest. A dual labour regime was never seriously questioned, the same
going for the multiple loopholes that induced malpractices.
17  That  would  soon  change.  The  early 1950s  witnessed  a  surge  in  international
condemnations of Portuguese colonial labour policies. As no institutionalized channels
for native workers to express their grievances were in place, and as abuses multiplied,
international  fora  provided  a  privileged  space  for  denunciations.  In  particular,  the
developments  taking  place  at  the  UN Economic  and Social  Council  and at  the  ILO,
namely the creation of two international experts’ committees on slavery and forced
labour,  added  unprecedented  pressure  on  imperial  authorities.  These  events  were
closely  related  with  the  then  fully-fledged  bipolar  conflict,  but  they  clearly  had
implications for colonial powers.27
18  The  workings  of  both  committees  considerably  raised  Portuguese  imperial
administrative  anxieties,  justified  by  demands  of  accurate  statistical  and  legal
information about labour policies and conditions in the colonies. Given the fact that the
Portuguese government was not a member of the UN, there was a strong resistance to
providing the requested information. Also, the idea that this process could lead to an in
situ inspection  added  to  imperial  fears. 28 Voices  within  the  bureaucratic  chain
advocated for a non-cooperative stance vis-à-vis international institutions. However, it
was just untenable to refuse to cooperate tout court, as several authorities understood.
International  political  circumstances,  the  long  historical  record  on  the  topic,  and
present local realities made that option politically unsustainable.
19  Increasingly,  the  problem  of  “native  labour”  in  Portuguese  colonies,  especially  its
coercive modalities, became closely intertwined with international and transnational
developments. As one inspector stated, this was a “delicate” problem given that the
social  question,  including  the  “human  rights  of  the  less  developed  peoples  of




was mandatory to “sustain the Portuguese position in such a sensitive and important
issue,” according to a Foreign Affairs official.30
20  Most  importantly,  the  ad-committee  on forced labour  was  not  a  mere  institutional
repository of legal information and statistics. As in the past, critics of the empire were
able  to  provide  their  own  insights  and  bring  specific  colonial  policies  under  the
spotlight. That was the case, for instance, of the representative of Byelorussia, or the
World Federation of Trade Unions and the Anti-Slavery Society. Together they brought
fresh  accusations  against  the  Portuguese  empire  labour  records.  The  coerced
mobilization  of  migrant  labour  to  S. Tomé,  the  widespread  prevalence  of  contract
labour in Angola and the compulsory cultivation programmes in the northern part of
the country or the conditions of recruitment of Mozambican workers to South Africa
mines were some of the most compelling examples: the persistence of state-sponsored
coercive modalities of labour exaction was not an unusual reality. The committee also
signalled  the  existence  of  legal  dispositions  conducive  to  forced  labour  and  the
Portuguese resistance to ratify any ILO convention related to freedom at work.31
21  This set of accusations triggered new efforts by Portuguese authorities to cope with the
diplomatic challenges. Again, the options of reforming or integrating empire clashed
with  each  other  and  took  different  shapes.  The  possibility  of  ratifying  the 1930
convention on forced labour re-emerged. The Portuguese understood they were in an
“uncomfortable” position: side by side with South Africa, they were the only colonial
power  which  had not  ratified  the  convention.32 But  they  were  also  aware  that  the
ratification of the Convention would add extra demands of information about labour
practices  and  policies  and,  therefore,  open  up  new opportunities  for  critics  of  the
empire to formulate their denunciations within an institutionalized framework.
22  For the time being, Portuguese authorities refused to ratify the Convention. Fear of
international meddling and the acknowledgement of prevailing colonial realities were
the most compelling arguments to block the ratification, and they conditioned even the
most “reformist” voices within the imperial  bureaucracy.  As one imperial  inspector
remarked, those facts (which included, for instance, the demographic “drain” in areas
of  heavy  recruitment  by  the  Angolan  diamond  company)  contributed  to  making
“impossible the defence of our position regarding accusations which often are made
against us in the international circles”.33 Notwithstanding, the political implications of
Portuguese omission in relation to international labour conventions regarding colonial
territories  were  increasingly  acknowledged  at  the  different  levels  of  imperial  and
colonial administration. As one inspector remarked, “if the state of affairs” was known
abroad,  one  could  expect  its  “magnified  echo  on  the  press  or  any  international




23  In  the  late 1950s,  political  and  diplomatic  circumstances  changed.  The  Portuguese
state’s late entrance at the UN brought its colonial politics under a new spotlight. The
strict refusal to debate any aspect of the political self-determination question –when
decolonization in other colonial territories, was gaining momentum– made cooperation




24  As  Portuguese  officials  stubbornly  resisted  any  kind  of  colonial  labour  reform  or
international integration, critics of the colonial labour record grew more vocal. One of
these  cases  was  that  of  the  British  journalist  and  historian  Basil  Davidson.  Having
visited Angola and being closely in touch with the Anti-Slavery Society and with the ILO
official responsible for non-metropolitan territories, Robert Gavin, Davidson managed
to interview dozens of witnesses and published, in 1955, his book, African Awakening, in
which he denounced labour policies and practices in Portuguese colonies. The Anti-
Slavery  Society  persisted  in  its  denunciations  of  forced  labour  in  the  Portuguese
colonies, both at the UN and at the ILO.35 New information was made available. More
localized  initiatives  also  took  place.  That  was  the  case  of  a  denunciation  by  the
International League of Human Rights of labour conditions in the coffee plantations of
northern Angola, based on the testimonies of several African workers.36
25  The Portuguese  government  and colonial  authorities  repudiated all  the  accusations
publicly. Internally, however, international events and processes became increasingly
thought  of  in  relation  to  efforts  for  social  reform  and  international  normative
integration. Forced labour in Portuguese African colonies was, at this time, a regular
topic of  diplomatic  correspondence.  The solution was to ratify the 1930 Convention
in 1956, during the International Labour Conference devoted to discussing the creation
of a new convention on forced labour.  The latter would eventually be promulgated
in 1957 and ratified by the Portuguese in 1959. Actors such as Alexandre Ribeiro da
Cunha, the Portuguese representative at the ILO, António Gomes de Almendra, a
Portuguese ILO official with close relations with the Portuguese government, or Álvaro
Neves  da  Fontoura,  an  expert  on  the  ILO  committee  on  social  policy  in  non-
metropolitan territories, played a non-negligible part in this process.
26  The solution, therefore, was to ratify international instruments that could legitimize
the Portuguese empire as a polity perfectly in tune with international standards, while
avoiding changing legislation and social practices in the colonies. The ILO, the “least
dangerous” or, in fact, the “least irresponsible”, UN specialized agency, as Ribeiro da
Cunha dubbed it, seemed the most suitable institution to advance Portuguese claims of
imperial legitimacy.37 These were based on two fundamental arguments. The first was
that  the  Portuguese  empire  was  a  unitary  polity  with  no  difference  whatsoever
regarding its territorial components and its racially distinct populations. The second,
and closely related to the first, was that there was no trace of racial discrimination in
the  political-juridical  structure  of  the  empire.  Therefore,  there  was  a  torrent  of
ratifications of  ILO conventions during these years regarding the abolition of  penal
sanctions  or  non-discrimination  in  employment.  Crucially,  the  ILO  Convention  on
Indigenous and Tribal Populations was ratified by the Portuguese during these years.
For imperial and colonial authorities, the ratification of the Convention would be the
best  diplomatic  argument  against  those  who  charged  the  indigenato   regime  of
crystalizing a fundamental distinction between natives and citizens.38
27  Internal exchanges uncovered more clearly the décalage between administrative socio-
political  imaginations and international  standards.  For instance,  when debating the
ratification  of  the  Convention  on  Indigenous  and  Tribal  Populations,  one  official
suggested that the “black race” reference in the indigenato should be abolished, but the
decree  kept  it.  At  the  same  time,  he  recognized  that  “a  certain  degree  of
discrimination” was inescapable. Another solution was to substitute the legal concept




abolishing penal sanctions in case of breach of contract, in order to conform with ILO
Convention no. 104, one official supported the idea, arguing that this stimulus to work
could still be used through an administrative expedient.40
28  A critical  problem resulted from the need not to “break the principle of  territorial
unity”41, since ILO conventions allowed, through article 35 of the constitution, not to
apply  the  conventions  to  parts  of  the  state  territory.  But  although  several  of  the
dispositions  adopted  could,  and  would,  not  be  implemented  in  the  colonies,  the
Portuguese government nonetheless refrained from invoking article 35. When in 1960
the Portuguese government extended the metropolitan laws of collective bargaining to
colonial territories before the first ILO African Regional conference, they did so because
it  was  fundamental  to  prove  that  in  the  “overseas  provinces  there  was  similar
legislation to that of the metropole”.42 The fact that the “natives” could not join the
negotiations because they had no representative trade unions was not detrimental to
the diplomatic manoeuvring.
29  That was the fundamental rationale of Portuguese action towards the ILO during those
years. But despite its mostly instrumental nature, these decisions had consequences as
they  increasingly  confronted  imperial  and  colonial  officials  with  international
standards. And, surely more important, it opened new possibilities for ILO interference
in colonial affairs.
30  That would occur very soon. Amidst the eruption of organized anti-colonial violence in
Angola and the initiative of Liberia to discuss these events at the UN Security Council,
Ghana’s government filed a complaint at the ILO arguing that the Portuguese failed to
fulfil their obligations regarding the 1957 Convention on forced labour.43 According to
the accusation statements, forced labour in Portuguese colonies was the direct outcome
of colonialism. The constitution of an inquiry commission allowed for the formation of
a rather heterogeneous coalition that provided new information and testimonies about
Portuguese  colonial  labour  realities.  The Anti-Slavery Society  and the  International
League of  Human Rights provided privileged information,  the former gathering the
testimonies of two Angolan refugees.44 Organizations not formally invited, such as the
Baptist Missionary Society or the American Committee on Africa, managed to channel
their own sources and testimonies through the authorized organizations. Individuals
such as  Basil  Davidson were  called  to  provide  first-hand information.  Anti-colonial
activists  from  Guinea,  Angola  and  Mozambique  also  got  involved  with  Ghana’s
authorities.45
31  The inquiry commission was given the task of evaluating the merits of the complaint.
In order to do so, the three experts, the Swiss Paul Ruegger, the Uruguayan Enrique
Armand-Ugon and the Senegalese  Isaac  Forster,  had to  scrutinize  huge amounts  of
information  related  to  Portuguese  colonial  and  imperial  legislation  as  well  as  the
records of its past interaction with the ILO. They interviewed several witnesses, a list
made of Portuguese officials, private agents, and foreign missionaries. In sharp contrast
with what was going on at the UN (the Portuguese government refused any visits to its
territories),  the three experts were allowed to travel to Angola and Mozambique in
December 1961. There were strict limitations. Only facts that had occurred after the
implementation of the Convention, in November 1960, could be used as proof. The visits
lasted one week and, from the records, it is pretty clear that Portuguese authorities
conditioned and prepared all the interviewees. Notwithstanding, the experts were able




32  While the inquiry commission, in its final report,  recognized that some evidence of
forced labour had existed in the past, it categorically rejected Ghana’s accusation that
the  ratification  was  a  mere  diplomatic  gesture  to  elide  the  crude  reality  of  forced
labour.  That  was  linked,  of  course,  with  the  strict,  mostly  juridical,  terms  of  the
mandate. But the fundamental reason was that the commission and ILO officials were
satisfied  (even  if  not  completely)  with  the  reforms  meanwhile  adopted  by  the
Portuguese government.  In May 1961,  the compulsory cultivation of  cotton and the
intervention of the administration on recruitment were formally abolished and a legal
framework for autonomous labour inspectorates was put in place. In September 1961,
the indigenato was repealed. And, critically, when the commission published its final
report  in 1962,  the  Portuguese  government  had  committed  itself  to  repealing  the
Native Labour Code. A new code was promulgated a couple of months later. In theory, it
made no racial or ethnic distinction, allowed for no modality of coerced labour and,
perhaps decisively, was the result of a strict scrutiny by the ILO committee of experts
on the application of conventions and recommendations.
33  Surely, this was the result of broader international and imperial dynamics, especially
those related to the eruption of the colonial war. But the fact was that the changes
introduced corresponded to long-held requests by the ILO. And, clearly, they did not
match what were the prevailing realities and concerns on the spot.
34  In  fact,  in  the  late 1950s  and  early 1960s,  several  reports  by  local  officials  and
inspectors signalled that forced labour or similar modalities of labour extraction were
widespread in the Portuguese colonies. Esteves Felgas, governor of the Congo district,
stated that the Native Labour Code had been “abandoned” because that was a code for
“voluntary workers” and “those do not exist.”46 Ferreira Martins, an imperial inspector,
in 1961, just after the beginning of the riots in the north of Angola, stated that native
policy  was  “one  of  the  most  urgent, serious  and  delicate”  problems  in  Angola.47
“Compelled labour” was prominent among them. For Joaquim Henriques, “Compelled
labour has been the more important cause for emigration and the main reason for
native population’s discontent”.48 Less critical officials stated that “compelled labour, in
the proper meaning, does not exist.” What existed was the “repression of vagrancy”.49
In  Mozambique,  inspector  Mário  Costa  stated  that  women were  forced to  cultivate
cotton against their will.50 
35  These were just some reports; others exist. They signal the extreme resilience of forced
labour in the Portuguese empire. Most of them were critical in their assessment and
urged  reforms.  But  on  the  eve  of  the  major  transformations  of 1961/1962,  it  is
remarkable  how  far  they  were  from  precepts  that  would  soon  be  established.  For
Ferreira  Martins,  the indigenato regime should be “updated,”  not  abolished. 51 Mário
Costa advocated that one should “avoid the ‘escape’ to the moral duty to work” of the
native.52 For Joaquim Henriques it  was mandatory to “abolish compelled labour (…)
without failing to take the native to fulfil its moral and social duty of useful work.”53
Esteves Felgas simply claimed that “free labour was […] a dangerous illusion.”54 In sum,
these officials’ prospects of political and social transformation lagged far behind the
contents of the sudden legal changes that occurred between 1961 and 1962. Particular
historical  circumstances  evaluated primarily  under  a  diplomatic  prism,  but  also  an
increasing awareness of  international  debates and norms regarding colonial  labour,




36  As this article shows, one must be cautious in evaluating the impact of political and
legal transformations on local conditions. Within an authoritarian state such as the
Portuguese,  opportunities  for  denouncing  malpractices  were  rather  limited.  They
became  even  more  so  in  a  context  shaped  by  three  scenarios  of  colonial
counterinsurgency.  Also,  disjunctions  between,  on  the  one  hand,  imperial
proclamations  and  legal  texts,  and  on  the  other,  actual  labour  conditions  were
recurrent in the history of Portuguese colonialism.55 In 1968, for instance, one inspector
still referred to the existence of several hundreds of “contract” workers in Icolo and
Bengo, in Angola.56 In addition, the rhythm of international denunciations related to
colonial labour did not slow down after 1962.
37  Yet, one should not simply dismiss the impact of juridical transformations. In fact, with
the beginning of colonial  wars,  the need to make proof of  Portuguese colonialism’s
socio-economic achievements became more pressing. That was the only way to try to
curb increasing demands, expressed domestically and internationally, for political self-
determination of Portuguese African territories. In this process of legal transformation,
international dynamics played a crucial, even if not straightforward, role.
38  For  instance,  in 1963,  the  Lunda’s  district  governor,  Artur  Carmona,  praised  its
achievements  since 1961,  namely  its  ability  to  stop  administrative  intervention  in
recruitment. But he still believed that the “native” was not “completely apt to discern
its  needs and follow the westernized methods of  the labour market.” According,  to
Carmona, they were in need of special, repressive measures to avoid being abandoned
to idleness. More important than claiming that “our law is the most advanced in this or
that continent” was to adapt it to what it thought was the native “nature”.57 That is, the
political and diplomatic rationales that guided the legal and political transformations
on the  labour  field,  guided  by  international  standards,  were  still  disputed  by  local
officials. This can be seen as evidence that the Portuguese official mind was still attached
to the old methods. But it also indicates that external inputs generated new conflicts
and  disputes  within  the  imperial  administrative  chain.  They  certainly  cannot  be
ignored within the broader history of Portuguese late colonialism.
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ABSTRACTS
This  article  focuses  on  the  historical  relationship  between  the  Portuguese  empire  and  the
International Labour Organization (ILO) regarding the question of colonial  labour.  Through a
permanent dialogue with similar processes in other empires, it stresses two of its main tenets: 1)
the  impact  of  international  debates  on  colonial  labour  on  the  broader  question  of  imperial
legitimacy, showing how international dynamics impacted upon strategies of imperial resistance
and anti-colonial contestation; 2) the ways standard-setting and enquiry initiatives by the ILO
conditioned imperial political bodies and colonial realities, even when they did not entail a direct
or visible transformation of norms and practices.
Cet article se focalise sur les relations entre l’empire portugais et l’Organisation internationale
du Travail (OIT) concernant la problématique du travail en situation coloniale. En se rapportant à
des  processus  similaires  dans  d’autres  contextes  impériaux,  il  examine  deux  questions
fondamentales. Premièrement, l’impact des débats internationaux sur la question plus large de la
légitimité des empires.  L’enjeu est ici  de savoir comment les dynamiques internationales ont
façonné les  stratégies  de  résistance  et  de  contestation anticoloniale.  Deuxièmement,  l’article
analyse  la  manière  dont  l’établissement  de  normes  et  la  réalisation  d’enquêtes  par  l’OIT  a
conditionné  tant  les  organismes  politiques  impériaux  que  les  réalités  coloniales,  y  compris
lorsque cela n’a pas entrainé, sur le terrain, des transformations concrètes ou visibles en matière
de règles ou de pratiques.
INDEX
Mots-clés: Organisation internationale du Travail, travail colonial, empire portugais,
internationalisme







Après avoir obtenu un doctorat en histoire à l’Institut des sciences sociales de l’université de
Lisbonne, José Pedro Monteiro est actuellement chercheur au Centre pour les études sociales de
l’université de Coimbra. Il travaille sur les interconnexions entre internationalisme et
impérialisme en Afrique pendant la période coloniale tardive, en particulier sur la question du
travail. Il a récemment co-édité Internationalism, Imperialism and the Formation of the Contemporary
World : Pasts of the Present (Palgrave, 2017). Sa première monographie, Portugal e a Questão do
Trabalho Forçado : um Império sob Escrutínio (1944-1962), a été publiée en 2018 (Edições 70).
The « Least Irresponsible Organization »: the Portuguese Colonial Question an...
Histoire Politique, 41 | 2020
14
